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Abstract We examine whether the difference in governance structures influences the risk 
taking and performance of Islamic banks compared to conventional banks. Using a sample of 
52 Islamic banks and 104 conventional banks in 14 countries for the period from 2005 to 
2013, we conclude that the governance structure in Islamic banks plays a crucial role in risk 
taking as well as financial performance that is distinct from conventional banks. Particularly, 
we show that the governance structure in Islamic banks allows them to take higher risks and 
achieve better performance because of product complexities and transaction mechanisms. 
However, Islamic banks maintain a higher capitalization compared to conventional banks. 
These results support the research on Islamic investment and risk taking. Our results add a 
new dimension to the governance research that could be a valuable source of knowledge for 
policy makers and regulators in the financial services sector.  
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1 Introduction 
The recent literature on Islamic banks mainly attributes their better performance during crises 
to the nature of their financial products and operating models (Hasan and Dridi 2010; 
Bourkhis and Nabi 2013). In this paper, we add a new dimension to this literature by 
examining the impact of the difference in governance structures between Islamic and 
conventional banks on their risk taking and financial performance.    
 In the field of banking and finance, the world has experienced in the last few decades 
the evolution of the Islamic mode of banking and its rapid growth in Muslim countries. In 
particular, Muslim countries contain more than a quarter of the world’s population.1 In 
addition, Islamic finance has seen substantial expansion in non-Muslim countries in terms of 
global financial assets and market share. The financial assets of the Islamic financial sector 
totalled US$1.7 trillion in 2013 and grew 50% faster than the overall banking sector with an 
average annual growth of 17.6% from 2008 to 2012 (Ernst & Young 2012). Further, Islamic 
bank assets are expected to reach US$3.4 trillion by 2018 (Ernst & Young 2013) and US$6.5 
trillion by 2020 (IFSB 2010; Cihak and Hesse 2010). Despite the progress made by Islamic 
banks, the Islamic banking industry should not be viewed in isolation. The specific codes of 
behavior in the Muslim religion (see, e.g., Abedifier et al. 2013) and the distinctive character 
of Islamic banking have led to increasingly unique differences between Islamic and 
conventional banks.  
The difference between Islamic and conventional banking is that Islamic banking 
discards the conventional interest-based financial system and follows the principles of Islamic 
law promoting property rights, profit-risk sharing, and the sanctity of contracts (Zaher and 
Hassan 2001; Iqbal and Llewellyn 2002). The prohibition of interest or usury (riba) in Islam 
does not mean that credit is prohibited, capital is not rewarded, or that risk is not priced. By 
developing a Shari’ah-compliant alternative, Islamic banks offer a distinct business model 
                                                 
1
 In 2014, Muslim population was 2038.04 million, which was 28.26% of the total world population of 
7151.51 million. Muslim countries in Asia and Africa had 27.56% Muslim population (i.e., 1971.08 
million), while non-Muslim counties in North America, Europe, Oceania, and South America had 0.7% 
(i.e. 66.96 million) (see http://muslimpopulation.com/World).   
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from the conventional banks.
 2
 Unlike their conventional counterparts, Islamic banks have 
developed specific forms of financial contracts to replace the interest rate mechanisms in 
financial transactions.  
Furthermore, due to Shari’ah supervision on risk taking, Islamic banks are not equally 
exposed to external shocks.
3
 Hence, these banks are less susceptible to insolvency because of 
the nature of Islamic financial contracts that have a wider range of arrangements for risk and 
liability sharing between the bank and their clients compared with conventional banks. These 
differences provide for social, ethical, and moral financial solutions to economic problems in 
transactions through conformity with Shari’ah principles. Moreover, while conventional 
banks provide financial intermediation services on the basis of a rate of interest on assets and 
liabilities, Islamic banks can act as both an intermediary of funds and as an entrepreneur and 
financier of real business activities in their own right. 
 What distinguishes Islamic banks from their conventional counterparts is not only the 
replacement of interest but also the significant monitoring role that Shari’ah law plays in the 
governance structure as opposed to conventional banks (Mollah and Zaman 2015). In Islamic 
banks, while the customary board of directors performs the executive role, they also enforce 
the authority of the Shari’ah board to perform either supervisory or advisory roles, or both. 
Chowdhury and Hoque (2006) consider the Shari’ah board as a supra authority that is an 
integral part of Islamic banks’ governance.4 Further, in a study covering Islamic banks in 25 
countries, Mollah and Zaman (2015) find a positive impact of the Shari’ah board’s 
supervisory role on the performance of Islamic banks. 
                                                 
2
 Islamic banking offers a two-tiered business model: mark-up financing (murabaha) and profit-sharing 
financing (mudaraba and musharaka). Overtime, the former became the dominant mode of financing 
in Islamic banks given that there are some inherent problems in applying the latter in practice, such as 
moral hazard. 
3
 Islamic banks are neither exposed to toxic securities nor offered products like CDOs or MBS due to 
the prohibition by the Shari’ah (Ahmed 2009). The derivative products like CDS are prohibited under 
Islamic law due to the existence of risky or hazardous sale. In fact, Islamic law prohibits any 
transactions involving unnecessary uncertainty (gharar) and gambling (maysir), which includes short 
selling, arbitrage, betting and speculation (Aziz and Gintzburger 2009). 
 
4
 Although the governance structure of conventional banks in some countries like Germany or Austria 
includes a supervisory board, the monitoring mechanism of the Shari’ah Supervisory Board (SSB) is 
much more effective (Mollah and Zaman 2015).  
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The key question of this paper is: how strong is the governance structure of Islamic 
banks? We argue that the nature, quality, and commitment of the regular board of directors in 
Islamic banks and in conventional banks are different. This is because the former is charged 
with adhering to Islamic doctrine, which demands that specific codes of behavior be followed 
and reflected in financial arrangements and transactions. Thus, the governance structure in 
Islamic banking is unique because of the Shari’ah board’s supervision.  
Accordingly, there is an open empirical research question as to whether the different 
governance structure explains the risk taking and performance in Islamic banks. Therefore, 
given the distinctions between Islamic banks and conventional banks, this study examines 
whether their governance structure influences risk taking and performance differently. By 
using a sample of 52 Islamic banks and 104 conventional banks in 14 countries over the 
period from 2005 to 2013, we conclude that the governance structure in Islamic banks plays a 
crucial role in increased risk taking as well as enhanced financial performance, which is 
different from conventional banks.  
This study contributes to the literature on banking in several ways. First, this is the 
first cross-country study that examines the influence of the governance structure on the risk 
taking and financial performance of Islamic banks. By simultaneously analyzing both Islamic 
banks and conventional banks, we complement the works of Cihak and Hesse (2010), Hasan 
and Dridi (2010), Abedifar et al. (2013), Beck et al. (2013), and Mollah and Zaman (2015). 
These studies provide comparative analyses on financial stability, risk management, 
performance, and efficiency between these two types of banks.  
Second, this study constructs a unique database by using 12 hand-collected 
governance items, which has not been done in previous banking governance research. This 
data set captures a wider spectrum of measures of board and CEO structures, board 
competence, and board diversity for both Islamic banks and conventional banks. Therefore, 
this study provides a new governance dimension to the banking literature.  
Finally, in examining the effect of governance on risk taking and performance, this 
study also extends pooled sample estimations by splitting the sample into big and small 
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banks, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and non-GCC banks, Muslim majority population 
and non-Muslim majority population banks, and high Islamicity and low Islamicity banks.
5
 In 
a cross-country environment, these extended analyses capture some interesting findings. In 
particular, the governance-performance relations for small Islamic banks, Islamic banks in 
GCC countries, and the low Islamicity and non-Muslim majority regions. These results 
provide additional valuable insights into the nature and role of Islamic banks’ governance 
structure in performance and risk taking.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theory and hypotheses of the 
study. The data and method are described in section 3. Section 4 presents the empirical 
results, and section 5 concludes the study. 
 
2 Theoretical motivation and hypotheses development 
The corporate governance and bank risk-taking literature emphasizes shareholder and 
manager incentives. Similar to other corporations, bank shareholders have a preference for 
excessive risk taking due to the moral hazard problem, limited liability, and convex pay-off 
systems (Galai and Masulis 1976; Jensen and Meckling 1976; John et al. 1991). However, 
due to the higher level of information asymmetry in banks, dispersed and unsophisticated debt 
holders cannot prevent the shareholders from excessive risk taking by initiating complete debt 
contracts on an ex-ante basis (Dewatripont and Tirole 1994). Therefore, bank shareholders 
have strong incentives to undertake excessive risky investments to maximize their benefits at 
the expense of deposit insurers and taxpayers. In addition, John et al. (1991) conclude that 
risk-adjusted deposit insurance premiums and risk-adjusted capital requirements fail to 
mitigate the moral hazard problem and fully control banks’ risk-taking incentives. In such a 
context, the bank managers’ opportunistic behavior depends on the governance structure. 
Akhigbe and Martin (2008) and Pathan (2009) highlight the disclosure, governance, and risk-
taking practices of U.S. banks surrounding the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.  
                                                 
5
 We take the definition of Islamicity from Rehman and Askari (2010). 
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The studies by Sierra et al. (2006), Anders and Valledado (2008), Adams and Mehran 
(2012), Aebi et al. (2012), Francis et al. (2012), Wintoki et al. (2012), and Pathan and Faff 
(2013) investigate the governance mechanism and its effect on firms’ performance and value. 
Sierra et al. (2006) suggest that a strong board can improve a bank’s performance. Adams and 
Mehran (2012) produce similar results for the board’s size, but they fail to identify any 
relation between performance and independent directors. Anders and Valledado (2008), on 
the other hand, show a positive but concave effect for both banks’ boards and independent 
directors on performance. Furthermore, Wintoki et al. (2012) report no relation between a 
board’s size or independence and the firm’s performance, but Francis et al. (2012) show that 
better governed firms perform well during financial crises. Despite the well-known 
governance literature in the context of the banking industry, there is a relative lack of research 
on the relation between governance and risk taking in Islamic banks.   
The literature often separates the examination of issues pertaining to Islamic and 
conventional banks into the differences between their respective business models (Beck et al. 
2013). Islamic banks differ from conventional banks through the imposition of certain 
religious principles on the products offered, which are free from the establishment of interest 
(riba) (see, e.g., Obaidullah 2005) and excessive uncertainty (gharar) (Abedifier et al. 2013). 
Accordingly, Islamic banks have developed different operational mechanisms such as profit-
loss sharing (Mudaraba) and nonprofit-loss sharing (Murabaha and Ijara) (Khan and Ahmed 
2001) as alternatives to time deposits, debt financing, and lease financing in conventional 
banks. The Shari’ah board, which ensures banking operations and products are compliant 
with Islamic principles, is an important part of Islamic banks’ governance.  
The prohibition of receipts and payments of interest is the center of the Islamic 
financial system and is supported by other principles of Islamic doctrine that advocate for risk 
sharing, property rights, and the sanctity of contracts (Zaher and Hassan 2001). While 
conventional banks typically apply the concept of interest as a return on capital, Islamic banks 
rely on more sales-type products and services. These products and services are based on 
profit-loss sharing, mark-up financing and leasing, and relationship-type banking. The 
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interest-free financial system has attracted considerable attention from corporations, policy 
makers, and other stakeholders. Beck et al. (2013) find few significant differences between 
the business models of Islamic banks. They find evidence that Islamic banks are less cost 
effective but have a higher intermediation ratio, higher asset quality, and better capitalization. 
Cihak and Hesse (2010) find that the risk management of Islamic banks, compared to 
conventional banks, depends on the size of the banks. Abedifier et al. (2013) extends this 
finding by examining the relation between investor religiosity and a bank’s size.  
The religious convictions of the depositors and the operational mechanisms for profit-
loss sharing can help Islamic banks maintain pro-cyclical protection and reduce the risk of 
withdrawal because of loyalty to the banks in times of adverse conditions. However, Islamic 
banking practices can also increase investors’ risk aversion due to the banks’ relatively 
limited access to wholesale funding (Abedifier et al. 2013). Thus, there is no universal 
argument defining the risk and return behavior of Islamic banks compared with those of 
conventional banks.  
Some features can make Islamic banks less vulnerable to risk than conventional 
banks. For example, Islamic banks are better able to pass negative shocks on the asset side 
(e.g., loss sharing) through to the investment depositors (a profit sharing arrangement). The 
risk-sharing arrangements on the deposit side provide another layer of protection for the 
Islamic bank beyond its book capital (Abedifar et al. 2013). In addition, Islamic requirements 
that limit negligence or misconduct (operational risk) and difficulty in accessing liquidity put 
pressures on Islamic banks to be more conservative. This pressure results in less moral hazard 
and risk taking (Cihak and Hesse 2008). Furthermore, because investors (depositors) share in 
the risks and typically do not have deposit insurance; they have better incentives to exercise 
tight oversight of a bank’s management. Finally, Islamic banks have traditionally held a 
comparatively larger proportion of their assets in reserve accounts with central banks or in 
correspondent accounts than commercial banks (Cihak and Hesse 2008).  
The complexities associated with the administration of Shari’ah compliance represent 
an additional risk faced by Islamic banks. In addition, the profit-loss sharing mode of 
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financing does not require any collateral or guarantees, which can increase credit risk for 
Islamic financial institutions. On the other hand, lower leverage and higher solvency through 
reserved liquid assets can allow Islamic banks to meet stronger demand for credit and 
maintain a stable external rating (Hasan and Dridi 2010). So, even if Islamic investments are 
more risky than conventional investments due to the complexities of the products and the 
transaction mechanisms involved (Abedifar et al. 2013; Olson and Zoubi 2008), the question 
arises as to whether the higher risks are compensated for by higher returns. Thus, the research 
is not sufficient to address whether the risk-taking behavior of Islamic banks depends on their 
governance. This study brings new evidence to the Islamic banking literature. 
Islamic banks exhibit diverse operations and relations among depositors, banks, and 
investors. The large number of depositors and investors in Islamic banks are particularly 
concerned that their funds are invested in a Shari’ah-compliant manner (Chapra and Ahmed 
2002). In general, the agency problems in conventional banks arise when managers deviate 
from their obligation to maximize shareholders’ wealth. In the case of Islamic banks, there is 
an additional potential source of agency problems pertaining to whether all transactions and 
products properly conform to Shari’ah requirements, in particular profit-sharing contracts 
(mudarabah). The operations of Islamic banks suggest that the Islamic principles underlying 
the contracts result in unique agency relations (Safieddine 2009).   
Additionally, profit-loss sharing mechanisms use equity financing and risk sharing, as 
compared to conventional banks that use debt financing (Beck et al. 2013) and risk 
transference (Hasan and Dridi 2010). Relationship banking in Islamic banks can also act to 
reduce adverse selection and moral hazard problems through monitoring by depositors. 
Although these problems are expected to occur more often in the profit-sharing paradigm, an 
argument can be made that there is a higher level of trust between Islamic banks and their 
clients and, hence, the moral hazard risks are less. In conventional banks, relationship banking 
is confined to private banking services for prime clients, but in Islamic banking a close 
relationship between the bank and the client comes from shared values, trust, and mutual 
respect. Thus, some of the risks of Islamic banks can be mitigated by reducing transaction 
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costs and mitigating agency conflicts through monitoring by depositors rather than 
government intervention, such as deposit insurance (Beck et al. 2013). Alman (2012) 
elaborates that Shari’ah supervision mitigates risk taking. However, the empirical evidence 
shows that more studies in this area are needed in order to establish the relation between risk 
taking and the governance structure (Aggarwal and Yousef 2000; Khan 2010). Accordingly, 
we first test the difference in governance structures between Islamic and conventional banks 
and its impact on risk taking in Hypothesis 1.  
Hypothesis 1: Governance and risk taking in Islamic banks  
H01: The difference in governance structures between Islamic and conventional banks 
does not distinguish risk taking between these bank types.  
 
A rejection of H01 implies that the distinct characteristics of Islamic banks’ 
governance structure, driven by differences in the financial contracts offered by the banks and 
the establishment of the Shari’ah supervisory board, affect their risk-taking behavior.  
The foundation of Islamic banking stems from Islamic Shari’ah (Islamic Common 
Law), and Islamic banks comply with the basic principle that exploitative contracts based on 
interest, uncertainty, or contracts that involve risk or speculation are unenforceable. Financial 
transactions under these guidelines call for operations and financial products that yield fair, 
legitimate profits and economic social ‘added-value’ (Siddiqi 1999). Safieddin (2009) stresses 
that the governance structure in Islamic banking is unique because it also must ensure that all 
operations adhere to ethics and morality as outlined by Shari’ah (Abu-Tapanjeh 2009; 
Chowdhury and Hoque 2006). Mollah and Zaman (2015) address the role of the Shari’ah 
board and its impact on the performance of Islamic banks compared to conventional banks 
and report that performance increases in the presence of the Shari’ah board’s supervisory role. 
Accordingly, we further investigate the role that corporate governance plays in affecting 
performance in Islamic banks in Hypothesis 2.  
Hypothesis 2: Governance and performance in Islamic banks 
H02: The difference in governance structures between Islamic and conventional banks does 
not influence the performance of these bank types. 
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The rejection of H02 implies that the governance structures in Islamic banks that drive 
differences in risk taking also affect their performance.  
 The current banking governance literature tends to separate the examination of 
performance between Islamic and conventional banking institutions. In addition, the literature 
pertaining to the impact of Islamic banks’ governance and its impact on risk taking and 
performance remains relatively sparse, and the empirical relations remain unclear. While the 
establishment of Shari’ah principles is often intended to reduce the use of unfair and risky 
financial products and, thus, the operating risk of Islamic banks, the risks associated with the 
establishment of the Shari’ah board, limited access to wholesale capital, and credit risk 
stemming from exclusive Islamic financial contracts make the theoretical relation between 
Islamic banks’ governance structure and risk taking and performance unclear. Thus, our study 
extends the literature on Islamic banks’ governance structure and the risk-return relation.  
 
3 Data and method 
We use Bankscope’s database to form our primary sample for all Islamic banks during the 
period from 2005 to 2013. We find data for 169 Islamic banks and filter them by keeping only 
those having codes C1, C2, and C*
6
 because banks with these codes publish consolidated 
financial statements. We then filter the remaining banks with an independence indicator 
defined by Bureau van Dijk (BvD) as equal to A or B.
7
 Next, by following Beck et al. (2013), 
we filter the remaining banks based on three principles: (1) countries having both Islamic and 
conventional banks; (2) countries with at least four banks; and (3) banks with at least three 
years of data. After the filtering process, the final sample has 52 Islamic banks and 104 
                                                 
6
 Bankscope database offers six accounting consolidation codes: C1, C2, U1, U2, C*, and U*. Banks 
having accounting consolidation codes C1, C2 and C* indicate that the financial statements of the 
parent bank is consolidated with its subsidiaries, but the financial statements of the parent bank are not 
consolidated with its subsidiaries for the codes U1, U2, and U*. Thus, un-consolidated statements do 
not offer a complete financial picture of those banks. 
 
7
 This independence indicator consists of five categories. The categories A and B include companies 
where the main shareholder holds less than 50% of the total ownership of a company. We made this 
choice because in non-independent banks the governance mechanisms are influenced by the parent 
bank.  
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conventional banks in 14 countries. The banks in our sample come from Bahrain, Bangladesh, 
Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Malaysia, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Turkey, 
Yemen and the United Arab Emirates. Table 1 reports the country-wise distribution of the 
sample.  
_____________________ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
_____________________ 
 
3.1 Measures of dependent and explanatory variables 
We investigate the link between risk taking, performance, and the governance structure of 
Islamic banks. The risk-taking variable is the log of the Z-score (Log_Z), and the bank’s 
performance is measured by the return on assets (ROA).  
To capture the governance structure, we construct a composite corporate governance 
index (CGI) based on 12 governance variables listed in Table A1 of the appendix. The other 
explanatory variables include firm and country-specific variables. The full descriptions of the 
variables are in Table 2.  
_____________________ 
Insert Table 2 about here 
_____________________ 
 
 
To test hypotheses (H01–H02), we use the following models (1) – (2):  
For risk-taking, we use: 
𝑌𝑏.𝑐.𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 ∗ 𝐼𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑐 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐺𝐼𝑏,𝑐,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑐 ∗ 𝐶𝐺𝐼𝑏,𝑐,𝑡−1 + 𝛾 ∗ 𝑋𝑏,𝑐,𝑡−1 + 𝛿
∗ 𝑀𝐸𝑐,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑏,𝑐,𝑡………(1) 
For firm performance, we use: 
𝑌𝑏.𝑐.𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 ∗ 𝐼𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑐 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐺𝐼𝑏,𝑐,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑐 ∗ 𝐶𝐺𝐼𝑏,𝑐,𝑡−1 + 𝛾 ∗ 𝑋𝑏,𝑐,𝑡−1 + 𝛿
∗ 𝑀𝐸𝑐,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑏,𝑐,𝑡………(2) 
 
The variables for all of the models are: 
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Yb, c,t is the proxy for the risk taking and  performance of bank b in country c at time t.  
CGIb,c,t-1 is the lag of the corporate governance index of bank b in country c at time t. 
Xb,,c,t-1 is a matrix of the lag of firm-level variables.  
MEc is a matrix of country-level macroeconomic and supervisory variables. 
b,c,t is the error term; α0 is the constant; and , , , and  are the vectors of 
coefficient estimates. 
 
3.3 Estimation Method 
We use a random-effects GLS method for the regression analyses. We apply this technique, 
developed by Baltagi and Wu (1999) for several reasons. First, an OLS ignores the panel 
structure of the data (Gambin 2004). Second, a time-invariant parameter cannot be estimated 
with fixed-effect methods. Third, the CGI does not vary much over time, so the fixed-effect 
estimation could be inappropriate (Wooldridge 2002, p. 286) and could lead to a loss in 
degrees of freedom (Baltagi 2005, p. 14). Recent studies such as Pathan (2009) and Mollah 
and Zaman (2015) also use the random-effect GLS technique in their studies. Further, for a 
robustness check of our findings, we also use a two-step GMM method. 
 
3.4 Description of the data 
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables. The mean values of the log Z-score 
are 2.480 and 3.097 with standard deviations of 1.090 and 0.804 for Islamic and conventional 
banks respectively. The ROAs are 1.5% and 1.6% for the Islamic and conventional banks 
respectively. The t-tests offer comparisons between the means of the two samples. The 
conventional banks preserve a significantly higher level of distance to default, even though 
their mean ROA is nonsignificantly different between the two bank types.  
The CGI for the Islamic banks (the conventional banks) is 0.475 (0.385), 
respectively. The t-test statistics indicate that the Islamic banks attain significantly better CGI 
as compared to the conventional banks. These primary results indicate that the governance 
structures in the Islamic banks are relatively better than those of the conventional banks.  
Table 3 also reports the firm and county-level control variables. The descriptive 
statistics for asset size (Log_TA) indicate that a conventional bank’s size is significantly 
 13 
larger than that of an Islamic bank. The Islamic banks maintain 22.784% regulatory capital, 
while the conventional banks maintain 15.258%. This difference is significant. However, the 
conventional banks are highly leveraged compared to the Islamic banks (7.056% vs. 4.830%), 
which is significant. The conventional banks also hold more loans, compared to Islamic banks 
(53.7% vs. 48.3%), which is also significant. Furthermore, the return volatility (STDROA) is 
higher for Islamic banks compared to conventional banks (3.886 vs. 1.141). Nevertheless, 
there are country-level variations in the macroeconomic variables, banking regulation, and 
supervision but these differences are theoretically nonsignificant across bank types.  
____________________ 
Insert Table 3 about here 
_____________________ 
 
4 Empirical Results 
4.1 The impact of corporate governance on risk taking   
We present the regression results from investigating the impact of the CGI on risk taking as 
measured by the log Z-score. Our particular variable of interest is the interaction term 
between an Islamic bank dummy and the governance index variable (Islamic*CGIt-1). For 
some explanatory variables, including the corporate governance index (CGIt-1), we test the 
lagged effects by restricting the contemporaneous effects. Also, different classes of control 
variables, such as bank-level characteristics and macroeconomic and country-level indicators 
are included in different specifications denoted by R-squared, which improves the 
explanatory power of our models.  We also control for year and country fixed effects by using 
year and country dummies. Table 4 shows the results for the baseline estimations of Islamic 
and conventional banks (models 1–5)8, big versus small banks (models 7 and 8), GCC versus 
non-GCC (models 9 and 10), Muslim majority population versus non-Muslim majority 
population (models 11 and 12), and high Islamicity vs. low Islamicity (models 13 and14). We 
test the crisis impact by using a difference-in-difference specification (i.e., by adding the 
Islamic and crisis dummies and the interaction term ‘Islamic*CGI*crisis’) (see model 15).   
                                                 
8
 We discuss model 6 (GMM) in subsection 4.3 
 14 
Models 1–5 show that, reflecting the Shari’ah-supervised governance structure, 
Islamic banks tend to be more risk-adaptive than conventional banks, irrespective of year and 
country fixed effects. The sign of the interaction variable (Islamic*CGIt-1) is consistently 
negative and significant at the 5% level. These findings reject the null hypothesis H01 
(governance difference between Islamic banks and conventional banks does not influence the 
risk taking by Islamic banks). However, both the Islamic bank dummy and the CGI variables 
individually indicate a positive effect on the Z-scores that suggest the Islamic banks have less 
of a desire for high risk taking, consistent with Cihak and Hesse (2010). While their positive 
effect is either very weak or not significant, their combination appears to show more appetite 
for high risk taking. Aligned with a distinct governance style, such risk-taking behavior for 
Islamic banks is generally supported by a number of controlling factors, such as capital 
adequacy, deposit insurance, profit volatility, country-level bank supervision, and the 
inflation rate.      
The control variables generally have the expected signs. Specifically, capital 
adequacy (Tier1t-1) tends to have higher Z-scores because the coefficients are persistently 
positive across all specifications. Similarly, deposit insurance (Dinsur) has a positive link to 
the Z-scores, albeit weak in some specifications. These results indicate that, with a strong 
capital base and deposit insurance in place, Islamic banks can comfortably accept higher 
risks. Again, the Z-scores tend to decrease with profit volatility (Stdroat-1), size (Log_TAt-1), 
country-level supervision, and the inflation rate, as expected. These factors might encourage 
Islamic banks to take higher risks.  
In models 7 and 8, we report substantial differences between large and small Islamic 
banks. Both the Islamic bank dummy and CGI variables are positive and significantly 
associated with big banks only, which means they are well equipped to keep risk taking under 
control, which is not the case for small banks. The interaction term (Islamic*CGIt-1) shows no 
significant relation in either group; however, the sign is different, that is, positive with big 
banks and negative with small banks. Unlike big banks, the negative sign of the corporate 
governance index (CGIt-1) and the interactive term (Islamic*CGIt-1) in small banks suggests 
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that small Islamic banks are more prone to risk taking. These findings make sense, 
considering the resource constraints and lack of economies of scale faced by small Islamic 
banks.    
In the regression analysis that splits the sample based on GCC and non-GCC, we find 
more risk exposure in GCC countries than non-GCC. Given that governance systems are not 
quite as strong in GCC countries, Islamic banks are potentially more prone to high risk taking. 
A similar comparison is made between Muslim majority population (i.e., >90% Muslim) and 
non-Muslim majority population samples (models 11 and 12) and high Islamicity and low 
Islamicity samples (models 13 and 14), and we confirm no notable difference in models 11 
and 12. However, in models 13 and 14, high Islamicity Islamic banks display more risk 
taking. This is consistent with our baseline findings that these banks have strong and distinct 
governance structures that could lead them to take more risks. Finally, we analyze the crisis’ 
impact (model 15) and find no effect on the Islamic banks’ risk taking. This lack of an effect 
signifies that these banks are resilient in a crisis as compared to their conventional 
counterparts because of their higher capitalization.   
 
  _____________________ 
Insert Table 4 about here 
_____________________ 
 
4.2 The impact of governance on financial performance  
 
We follow a similar process in investigating the impact of the CGI on financial performance 
as measured by ROA. First, we test the lagged effects of the firm-level independent variables 
and different classes of control variables denoted with R-squared. This test improves the 
explanatory power of our models, Table 5 presents the results. In models 1–59, we find that 
across the models, the distinct governance structure of Islamic banks has a significantly 
positive effect on performance. Individually, the ROA is negatively and significantly 
associated with the Islamic bank dummy and negatively but insignificantly related to the CGI. 
                                                 
9
 See footnote 8 for model 6. 
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Interestingly their joint effects have a positive and significant relation with the ROA. This 
finding corresponds to our main result in Table 4 that Islamic banks’ governance structures 
allow them to embrace high risk taking on one hand and enhance financial performance on 
the other. The sign of the interactive variable (Islamic*CGIt-1) is consistently positive and 
significant at either the 1% or 5% levels in models 1–5. These findings reject the null 
hypothesis H02 (the governance difference between Islamic banks and conventional banks 
does not influence the financial performance of Islamic banks). 
For the control variables, both loans and profit volatility (STDROAt-1) show a strong 
positive effect on ROA that indicates high risk taking enhances financial performance. On the 
other hand, while size, capital adequacy, legal, and Islamicity indicate a weak and positive 
relation with ROA, Muslim majority population has a negative performance effect; and 
leverage, bank concentration, GDP growth, inflation, deposit insurance appear to have no 
significant impact.  
As to the other specifications, the governance in small Islamic banks has a positive 
effect on performance, albeit weak, despite having an insignificant and opposite sign on the 
Islamic bank dummy and CGI variables. The governance in big Islamic banks shows no effect 
on performance. Similarly, in models 9 and 10, the GCC tends to be positively associated 
with ROA, rather than the non-GCC, despite having a negative relation between ROA and the 
Islamic bank dummy. Again, in models 11 and 12 and models 13 and 14, we find a similar 
trend where a non-Muslim majority population and low Islamicity indicate a positive impact 
on ROA. These results are generally consistent with our baseline findings that the distinct 
governance structure of Islamic banks in each specification tends to cause better financial 
performance. Finally, we test the crisis’ impact on performance by using a difference-in-
difference specification in model 15. We show a negative effect from the crisis on 
performance, although risk taking remains unaffected.   
_____________________ 
Insert Table 5 about here 
_____________________ 
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Overall, the key results in Tables 4 and 5 show that  the  governance structure of 
Islamic banks plays a crucial role in higher risk taking and enhanced financial performance, 
which differs from the conventional banks.    
4.3 Robustness checks 
4.3.1 Two-step GMM regression analysis 
We use the two-step GMM approach adopted by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and 
Bond (1998) for endogeneity tests of the regression equations 1 and 2. This approach allows 
us to treat all of the explanatory variables as endogenous by orthogonally using their past 
values as instruments. It also creates a matching equation of the first differences for all of the 
variables. The GMM estimates the model by using the lagged values of the right-hand-side 
variables. The first difference eliminates the unobserved heterogeneity and omitted variable 
bias. This approach means that we treat all of the bank characteristics as endogenous 
covariates, while treating the country and macro controls as strictly exogenous. The GMM 
estimates are obtained using Roodman’s (2009) xtabond2 module in Stata. 
The regression results for governance and risk taking are reported in column 6 of 
Table 4, and the regression results for governance and performance are reported in column 6 
of Table 5.  The results show that the models are well-fitted with statistically insignificant test 
statistics for both the second-order autocorrelation in the second differences (AR(2)) and the 
Hansen J-statistics of over identifying restrictions. The residuals in the first difference should 
be serially correlated (AR(1)) by way of construction but the residuals in the second 
difference should not be serially correlated (AR(2)). Accordingly, the model fit and 
diagnostics section in column 6 in Tables 4 and 5 show the desirable statistically significant 
AR(1) and statistically insignificant AR(2) coefficients. Likewise, the Hansen J-statistics of 
over-identifying restrictions tests the null of the instrument’s validity, and the statistically 
insignificant Hansen J-statistics indicate that the instruments are valid in the two-step GMM 
estimation. Overall, the GMM estimates in Tables 4 and 5 are consistent with the main results 
reported in Tables 4 and 5 (columns 1–5), even after controlling for unobserved 
heterogeneity, simultaneity, and dynamic endogeneity.  
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6. Conclusions 
The purpose of this study is to test whether the difference in governance structures affect the 
risk taking and performance of Islamic and conventional banks. By using a sample of 52 
Islamic banks and 104 conventional banks in 14 countries for the period from 2005 to 2013, 
we conclude that the governance structure in Islamic banks plays a crucial role in higher risk 
taking and enhanced performance, which is distinct from conventional banks. Our results add 
a new dimension to the governance research on Islamic banks. Despite cross-country 
variations and a general perception of a conservative approach to risk taking, we provide 
evidence that the Shari’ah-supervised governance structures of Islamic banks help them 
undertake higher risks and achieve better performance. However, they maintain better 
capitalization compared to the conventional banks. 
The findings of this research are a valuable source of knowledge for policymakers 
and regulators, particularly in the financial services sector for devising strategies to deal with 
future financial crises. This research contributes to the comparative banking literature on 
corporate governance. Additionally, future research could further extend the role of the 
Shari’ah supervisory board.  
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Table 1 Sample distribution 
This table describes the sample of the study. The study considers 156 banks (52 Islamic and 104 conventional) in 14 
countries for the period from 2005 to 2013. The country-wise distribution of the banks, observations, and 
percentages are in columns 2–6. 
Country Islamic Banks Conventional 
Banks 
Pooled 
Sample 
(Banks) 
Observations Percentage (%) 
BAHRAIN 5 11 16 144 
10,256 
BANGLADESH 9 10 19 171 
12,179 
JORDAN 2 9 11 99 
7,051 
KUWAIT 8 6 14 126 
8,974 
LEBANON 1 7 8 72 
5,128 
MALAYSIA 5 12 17 153 
10,897 
PAKISTAN 1 6 7 63 
4,487 
QATAR 3 7 10 90 
6,410 
SAUDI ARABIA 1 8 9 81 
5,769 
SUDAN 4 4 8 72 
5,128 
SYRIA 2 6 8 72 
5,128 
TURKEY 2 2 4 36 
2,564 
YEMEN 1 3 4 36 
2,564 
UNITED ARAB 
EMIRATES 
8 13 21 189 
13,462 
TOTAL 52 104 156 1,404 100% 
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Table 2 Description of the variables 
This table presents the descriptions of the governance and other firm- and country-specific variables and includes the calculation procedure for each variable. 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE(S) 
NAME BBREVIATION CALCULATION PROCEDURE 
DEFAULT RISK Log_Z The Z-score is the distance to default estimated as the average ROA plus capital to asset ratio divided by the standard deviation of the ROA. Source: Beltratti and Stulz 
(2012), Fu et al. (2014), Laeven and Levine (2009) and Pathan (2009). The higher the value of the z-score, the lower the risk taking of the banks. We use the log of the Z-
score as a proxy for the insolvency risk. Source: Authors’ estimation 
FIRM PERFORMANCE ROA Net income divided by average total assets. Source: Bankscope 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INDEX (CGI) 
CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE INDEX 
CGI The corporate governance index is constructed based on 12 boardroom characteristics. The characteristics are: (1) Board Size: Is the board size of this bank smaller than the 
median board size of the sample? If yes, then one, otherwise zero. (2)  Independent Directors: Is the value of board’s independence larger than median of the sample? If yes 
then one, otherwise zero. (3) Female Director: Is there any female director on the board?  If yes then one, otherwise zero. (4) Board Meeting: Are the number of board 
meetings larger than the median board meetings of the sample? If yes, then one, otherwise zero. (5) Board Attendance: Are the percent of board attendance larger than 75%? 
If yes, then one, otherwise zero. (6) Board Committees: Are the number of board committees larger than the median board committees of the sample? If yes, then one, 
otherwise zero. (7) Chair Independence: Is the chairman independent? If yes then one, otherwise zero. (8) Chair/CEO Split: Are the roles of Chair/CEO split? If yes, then one, 
otherwise zero. (9) Internal CEO: If the CEO is not internally recruited, then one, otherwise zero.  (10) CEO Qualification: MA or higher then one, otherwise zero. (11)CEO 
Banking Experience: If the CEO has more than the median years of experience in the sample, then one, otherwise zero. (12) CEO Tenure: If the CEO has more than the 
median tenure in the sample then one, otherwise zero. The descriptive statistics for all 12 board characteristics are in Table A1 of the appendix. Source: Hand Collected 
BANK-SPECIFIC VARIABLES 
ASSET SIZE Log_TA Log of total assets. Source: Bankscope 
TIER 1 CAPITAL Tier1 Tier 1 capital. Source: Bankscope 
LEVERAGE Lev Customers’ Term Deposit/Equity. Source: Bankscope 
STD OF RETURNS Stdroa Standard deviation of ROA. 
LOANS Loans Loans/Total Assets (Loan). Loan is a liquidity ratio. This liquidity ratio indicates what percentage of the assets of the bank is tied up in loans. The higher this ratio is the less 
liquid the bank is. Source: Bankscope 
BANK 
CONCENTRATION 
HHI Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI) is a proxy for bank concentration. 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑐,𝑡 = ∑ (𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙_𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡,𝑐/∑ 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙_𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡,𝑐)
𝑛
𝑖=1
2𝑛
𝑖=1 . The HHI has a value between zero and one. 
The higher the value, the more the concentration. Authors calculation 
LEGAL SYSTEM Legal This a dummy variable for the legal system in the country. We use the value of zero if the country does not have Shari’ah law in its legal system, and the value one for 
countries that consider Shari’ah together with other legal system, and the value two if the legal system is based exclusively on Shari’ah law. 
ISLAMIC BANK Islamic Islamic is a dummy for Islamic banks. If the bank is an Islamic Bank then one, otherwise zero. 
COUNTRY-SPECIFIC VARIABLES 
GDP GROWTH RATE GDP_growth Annualized growth rate of GDP per capita. 
MUSLIM POPULATION Muslim_population Percent of Muslim Population. 
ISLAMICITY INDEX Islamicity We use the Islamicity index by Rehman and Askari (2010). The higher the value, the lower the Islamic value in the country. 
INFLATION RATE Inflation_rate Year-on-year change of Consumer Price Index (CPI). 
DEPOSIT INSURANCE Dinsur Deposit insurance is a score for the explicit deposit insurance from Caprio et al. (2007) (updated in 2008) using the World Bank (http://econ.worldbank.org) and Demirgüç-
Kunt et al. (2007) (http://www.luclaeven.com/Data.htm). 
BANK SUPERVISORY 
VARIABLES 
 Bank Supervision, Bank Capital Oversight, Bank Regulatory Restriction, and Bank Private Monitoring. Bank Supervision is a score for the power of the commercial bank 
supervisory agency, Bank Capital Oversight is a score for regulatory oversight of bank capital, Bank Regulatory Restriction is a score for regulatory restrictions on the 
activities of banks, and Bank Private Monitoring is a score for monitoring on the part of the private sector. The regulation variables are from Barth et al. (2004) and Caprio et 
al. (2007) that use data downloaded from the World Bank (http://econ.worldbank.org). 
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Table 3 Descriptive statistics 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the models for both Islamic and conventional banks. We report the paired sample mean difference (T-test) in column 
14. See Table 2 for the definitions of the variables. The ***, **,  and * represent  p-values of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10. 
Islamic Banks Conventional Banks 
 
Observation
s Mean Std. Median Skewness Kurtosis Observations Mean Std. Median Skewness Kurtosis 
Paired T-test (Islamic 
Vs. Conventional) 
Log_Z 347 2.480 1.090 2.510 -0.660 5.190 869 3.097 0.804 3.098 -.384 3.468 
-10.940*** 
ROA 349 0.015 0.060 0.010 -2.130 17.640 871 0.016 0.038 0.014 -9.656 291.885 
-0.149 
Islamic       468 1.000 0.000 1.000 . . 936 0 0 0 . . 
- 
CGI        346 0.475 0.157 0.417 -0.026 2.737 769 0.385 0.179 0.417 -.145 2.419 
8.007*** 
Log_TA 349 14.788 1.899 14.618 1.297 6.585 872 22.487 1.653 22.712 -.380 2.481 
-70.409*** 
Tier1 307 22.784 17.819 17.400 3.671 23.690 700 15.258 6.782 13.930 2.455 14.459 
9.109*** 
Lev 337 4.830 3.711 4.229 1.057 4.451 858 7.056 4.992 6.284 8.331 147.218 
-7.042*** 
Stdroa        351 3.886 4.984 1.454 1.494 3.851 871 1.141 3.033 0.605 7.825 66.756 
11.733*** 
Loans     337 0.483 0.252 0.561 -0.419 1.966 856 0.537 0.168 0.577 -.818 3.249 
-4.387*** 
HHI       468 0.243 0.120 0.190 0.643 2.248 936 0.245 0.131 0.180 0.823 2.394 
- 
Legal       468 0.731 0.486 1.000 -0.524 2.455 936 0.711 0.599 1.000 0.215 2.400 
- 
GDP_growth 440 4.892 4.776 5.520 -0.017 7.153 881 5.304 4.454 5.585 0.379 8.916 
- 
Muslim_population 468 81.154 10.613 81.000 -0.247 2.633 936 82.173 13.061 81.000 -0.365 1.973 
- 
Islamicity 468 81.066 33.114 60.000 0.917 2.863 936 86.868 32.150 85.000 0.737 2.572 
- 
Inflation_rate 468 60.637 34.963 59.000 0.080 1.942 936 60.053 35.868 60.000 0.067 1.837 
- 
Dinsur 306 0.252 0.208 0.286 0.013 1.668 675 0.266 0.214 0.285 -0.001 1.565 
- 
Bank Supervision 306 0.811 0.118 0.857 -0.495 1.697 675 0.837 0.118 0.857 -.614 1.948 
- 
Bank Regulatory 
Restriction 306 0.471 0.107 0.400 0.032 2.118 675 0.472 0.133 0.400 -0.561 2.287 
- 
Bank Private 
Monitoring 306 0.661 0.217 0.750 -1.659 5.821 675 0.606 0.268 0.750 -.716 2.981 
- 
Bank Capital 
Oversight 306 0.549 0.168 0.556 -0.104 2.161 675 0.496 0.156 0.444 0.340 2.613 
- 
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Table 4 Difference in governance between Islamic and conventional banks and its impact on risk taking 
 
This table presents the regression results for the governance difference between conventional and Islamic banks and its impact on risk taking. The risk-taking proxy is Log_Z. We use a 
corporate governance index (CGI) as the proxy for governance. See Table 2 for definitions of the other bank-specific and country-specific variables. Robust standard errors are reported 
in the parentheses. The ***, **,  and * represent  p-values of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10. 
 Baseline Estimation Robustnes
s Check 
Big Vs. Small GCC Vs. Non-GCC Muslim Maj. Vs. Non-
Muslim Maj 
High Islamicity vs. 
Low Islamicity 
Crisis 
Impact 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
VARIABLES Random 
Effect 
Random 
Effect 
Random 
Effect 
Random 
Effect 
Random 
Effect 
GMM 
Model 
Big Small GCC Non-GCC +90% 
Muslim 
-90% 
Muslim 
High 
Islamicity 
Low 
Islamicity 
Random 
Effect 
Islamic 0.446 0.289 0.379 0.091 0.091 0.106 0.567*** 0.572 -2.464** 0.184 0.525* -0.078 1.362*** -2.464** 0.016 
 (0.346) (0.361) (0.360) (0.519) (0.383) (0.269) (0.142) (0.463) (1.110) (0.334) (0.288) (0.567) (0.429) (1.110) (0.269) 
CGIt-1 0.082* 0.105* 0.098* 0.103* 0.103* 0.224* 0.159** -0.115 0.177* 0.102 0.073 0.157 0.118 0.177* 0.080 
 (0.047) (0.057) (0.056) (0.059) (0.062) (0.118) (0.066) (0.140) (0.106) (0.064) (0.064) (0.107) (0.146) (0.106) (0.060) 
Islamic*CGIt-1 -0.808** -0.473** -0.525** -0.615*** -0.615** -0.198** 0.127 -0.308 -0.369 0.362 -0.168 -0.591 -2.067** -0.369  
 (0.343) (0.192) (0.192) (0.235) (0.272) (0.101) (0.125) (0.339) (0.338) (0.382) (0.350) (0.375) (0.907) (0.338)  
Log_TAt-1  -0.018 -0.016 -0.067 -0.067* -0.164** -0.148* -0.031 -0.404*** 0.001 0.021 -0.049 -0.001 -0.404*** -0.025 
  (0.031) (0.031) (0.049) (0.038) (0.078) (0.076) (0.050) (0.079) (0.028) (0.037) (0.048) (0.021) (0.079) (0.027) 
Tier1t-1  0.016*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.019*** 0.010** 0.024*** 0.002 0.009* 0.017*** -0.013 0.024*** 0.016*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.014) (0.004) (0.003) 
Levt-1  -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.046 0.001 -0.038*** 0.003 -0.026*** -0.046*** 0.000 -0.058*** 0.003 -0.002 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.008) (0.001) (0.012) (0.002) (0.008) (0.011) (0.003) (0.011) (0.002) (0.002) 
Stdroat-1  -0.252*** -0.232*** -0.236*** -0.236*** -0.142*** -0.798*** -0.232*** -0.231*** -1.207*** -0.781*** -0.201*** -1.351*** -0.231*** -
0.235*** 
  (0.045) (0.046) (0.047) (0.039) (0.042) (0.104) (0.041) (0.058) (0.139) (0.106) (0.041) (0.124) (0.058) (0.034) 
Loanst-1  -0.132 -0.041 -0.094 -0.094 -0.286 0.252 -0.848*** -0.165 -0.182 -0.116 -0.057 -0.557 -0.165 -0.016 
  (0.228) (0.234) (0.227) (0.165) (0.132) (0.320) (0.310) (0.275) (0.257) (0.282) (0.277) (0.486) (0.275) (0.163) 
HHI  -0.240 -0.145 -0.022 -0.022 -0.265 -0.481 1.076 0.382 -0.593 0.382 -0.749 0.866 0.382 -0.085 
  (0.569) (0.602) (0.625) (0.654) (0.344) (0.761) (1.246) (0.874) (0.884) (0.807) (0.970) (2.613) (0.874) (0.611) 
Legal  0.262 7.801** 0.228 11.215** 1.861 -3.770** 2.291 0.841 -2.482*** 0.056 0.761 2.499 0.841 7.622** 
  (0.374) (3.051) (1.504) (5.207) (0.699) (1.651) (3.231) (4.302) (0.482) (0.447) (0.478) (2.091) (4.302) (3.358) 
GDP_growth  0.001 0.001 0.004 0.004 0.007 0.002 0.009 0.008 0.003 0.003 -0.000 -0.005 0.008 1.40e-02 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.009) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.036) (0.007) (0.004) 
Muslim_population  -0.019 -0.274* -0.039 -0.430* -0.005 0.234*** -0.027 -0.044 0.124*** 0.030* 0.028 0.040*** -0.044 -0.273 
  (0.016) (0.165) (0.062) (0.228) (0.006) (0.054) (0.087) (0.278) (0.025) (0.017) (0.019) (0.008) (0.278) (0.167) 
Islamicity  0.002 0.106** 0.007 0.143* 0.004 -0.090*** 0.032 0.248 -0.046*** 0.004 0.047*** 0.007 0.248 0.104** 
  (0.006) (0.044) (0.022) (0.078) (0.010) (0.021) (0.043) (0.305) (0.009) (0.009) (0.014) (0.005) (0.305) (0.049) 
Inflation_rate  -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001* -0.001 -4.93e-02 -3.75e-02 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001* 4.41e-03 -0.001** 0.000 -0.001 -0.001** 
  (3.47e-02) (3.526e-
02) 
(3.46e-02) (3.811e-
02) 
(2.6e-02) (4.55e-02) (0.001) (0.001) (4.00e-02) (3.83e-02) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Dinsur  1.055* 6.351* -0.388 4.913** 2.013** -0.643 6.587 1.09e-03 -0.381 1.693 0.649* 1.257 2.338* 5.949** 
  (0.626) (3.497) (1.967) (2.150) (0.986) (1.976) (4.582) (2.43e-03) (0.952) (2.133) (0.391) (0.956) (1.381) (3.018) 
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Bank Supervision   -9.415***  -12.581**  -1.101 -1.919 1.286 2.470*** -1.093 0.281 -2.951 -0.875 -9.105** 
   (3.216)  (5.002)  (2.610) (4.262) (0.965) (0.662) (1.278) (1.288) (3.144) (1.005) (3.585) 
Bank Private Monitoring   3.524  6.316  -7.522*** -0.794 0.873 -2.920*** 1.105 2.994 3.630 6.593** 3.549 
   (4.260)  (5.086)  (2.389) (3.050) (0.764) (0.901) (1.091) (2.031) (2.791) (3.199) (3.919) 
Bank Capital Oversight   3.252  3.144  2.110 3.638 1.445 2.498 -0.085 -1.805 1.025 3.073 2.966 
   (3.137)  (1.898)  (1.903) (3.151) (1.371) (2.098) (0.539) (1.765) (0.996) (2.973) (2.605) 
Bank Regulatory Restriction   2.126**  3.749  9.615** 1.906 2.091* 2.346 1.009 3.179 4.279* 4.449 1.278 
   (0.892)  (4.101)  (4.230) (1.433) (1.252) (1.681) (0.820) (1.592) (2.547) (3.129) (0.947) 
Crisis               -0.028 
               (0.021) 
Islamic*Crisis*CGIt-1               0.058 
               (0.132) 
Log_Zt-1      0.676***          
      (0.048)          
Constant 2.726*** 4.540*** 13.319*** 7.269** 22.784** 0.377*** 6.235*** 3.160*** 1.038*** 11.099*** 4.148*** 6.014*** 2.993*** 3.009*** 13.658**
* 
 (0.406) (0.134) (0.881) (0.457) (0.175) (0.109) (0.682) (0.368) (0.510) (0.701) (0.298) (0.710) (0.602) (0.408) (0.612) 
Chi2 143.32*** 103.88*** 154.96*** 124.39*** 170.60*** 99.47*** 60.71*** 141.33*** 83.41*** 73.09*** 56.46*** 43.26*** 50.83*** 48.16*** 143.84**
* 
Observations 904 415 415 415 415 341 279 136 161 254 218 197 88 161 415 
Overall R2 0.363 0.502 0.545 0.526 0.526  0.534 0.555 0.397 0.518 0.540 0.548 0.542 0.397 0.537 
Year FE NO NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES NO 
Country FE NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
AR(1)-p-value      0.009          
AR(2)-p-value      0.626          
Hansen-J- P-value      0.938          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 27 
Table 5 Difference in governance between Islamic and conventional banks and its impact on financial performance 
 
This table presents the regression results for the governance difference between conventional and Islamic banks and its impact on financial performance. The performance proxy is ROA. We 
use a corporate governance index (CGI) as the proxy for governance. See Table 2 for definitions of the other bank-specific and country-specific variables. Robust standard errors are reported 
in the parentheses. The ***, **,  and * represent  p-values of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10. 
 Baseline Estimation Robustnes
s Check 
Big Vs. Small GCC Vs. Non-GCC Muslim Maj. Vs. Non-
Muslim Maj 
High Islamicity vs. 
Low Islamicity 
Crisis 
Impact 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
VARIABLES Random 
Effect 
Random 
Effect 
Random 
Effect 
Random 
Effect 
Random 
Effect 
GMM 
Model 
Big Small GCC Non-GCC +90% 
Muslim 
-90% 
Muslim 
High 
Islamicity 
Low 
Islamicity 
Random  
Effect 
Islamic -0.021** -0.029** -0.029** -0.027** -0.026** -0.018** 0.009 -0.056 -0.096** -0.004 0.012* -0.120** 0.001 -0.086** 0.013 
 (0.009) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.009) (0.017) (0.045) (0.045) (0.005) (0.007) (0.054) (0.009) (0.043) (0.008) 
CGIt-1 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -2.97e-02 -0.002 0.001 -0.008 -0.011 0.003 0.003 -0.002 0.006 -0.018 0.004 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.002) (0.029) (0.024) (0.002) (0.003) (0.018) (0.004) (0.024) (0.008) 
Islamic*CGIt-1 0.064*** 0.066*** 0.070*** 0.066** 0.066** 0.206** -0.016 0.103* 0.165*** 0.009 -0.011 0.134** -0.002 0.133**  
 (0.019) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.082) (0.039) (0.059) (0.061) (0.010) (0.013) (0.055) (0.020) (0.060)  
Log_TAt-1  0.002* 0.002* 0.002* 0.002 0.009* 0.001 0.001 -0.005 2.59e-02 0.001* -0.002 -4.04e-02 -0.002 0.002 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.005) (0.004) (3.27e-02) (4.26e-02) (0.004) (4.02e-02) (0.004) (0.001) 
Tier1t-1  6.07e-02* 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 0.003 4.87e-03 0.001 0.001 -4.61e-03 -1.33e-02 0.001* 0.001** 0.001 0.001 
  (3.16e-02) (3.19e-02) (3.17e-02) (3.16e-02) (4.23e-02) (1.17e-02) (0.001) (0.001) (8.98e-03) (1.19e-02) (0.001) (2.84e-02) (0.001) (3.12e-
02) 
Levt-1  1.96e-02 1.46e-02 1.77e-02 1.74e-02 4.67e-002 2.39e-02*** 2.46e-02 6.94e-03 1.35e-02 -1.19e-02 1.97e-02 1.57e-02 -4.96e-03 1.50e-02 
  (2.75e-02) (2.81e-02) (2.87e-02) (2.87e-02) (2.17e-02) (7.84e-03) (0.002) (5.29e-02) (1.37e-02) (2.12e-02) (4.55e-02) (2.29e-02) (0.001) (2.82e-
02) 
Stdroat-1  0.314*** 0.309*** 0.303*** 0.288*** 0.368** 0.502*** 0.258*** 0.262*** 0.616*** 0.485*** 0.262*** 0.679*** 0.270*** 0.275*** 
  (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.046) (0.147) (0.039) (0.086) (0.076) (0.032) (0.039) (0.070) (0.052) (0.077) (0.045) 
Loanst-1  0.056*** 0.072*** 0.074*** 0.071*** 0.021*** 0.014** 0.101*** 0.122*** -0.004 0.005 0.099*** -0.002 0.126*** 0.076*** 
  (0.011) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.007) (0.006) (0.034) (0.030) (0.005) (0.007) (0.024) (0.011) (0.030) (0.014) 
HHI  0.105** 0.012 0.027 0.030 0.033 0.015 -0.001 0.019 0.035 0.014 -0.038 0.085 -0.008 0.017 
  (0.042) (0.096) (0.104) (0.104) (0.098) (0.027) (0.322) (0.198) (0.025) (0.035) (0.196) (0.066) (0.201) (0.102) 
Legal  0.033** 0.223** 0.194* 0.157 0.090 0.070** 0.033 0.038 0.012* 0.012 0.193 0.219* -0.002 0.187 
  (0.017) (0.098) (0.106) (0.130) (0.056) (0.035) (0.175) (0.108) (0.007) (0.012) (0.231) (0.117) (0.081) (0.128) 
GDP_growth  9.73e-02* 0.001* 3.59e-03 1.59e-03 0.001 2.98e-02** 0.003 0.002 2.24e-02* -8.40e06 -0.001 9.23e-03 0.001 -0.000 
  (5.45e-02) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (1.51e-02) (0.002) (0.001) (1.33e-02) (2.50e-02) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Muslim_population  -0.002** -0.010** -0.009** -0.008* -0.007** -0.003* -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -4.52e-02 0.001 -1.32e-02 4.43e-02 -0.009* 
  (8.48e-02) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.007) (4.38e-02) (0.001) (0.002) (1.72e-02) (0.005) (0.005) 
Islamicity  0.001** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003 3.03e-02 0.001** 3.29e-02 0.003 2.26e-02 1.85e-02 0.001 -8.51e-03 -0.001 0.003* 
  (3.05e-02) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (4.78e-02) (0.002) (0.007) (1.61e-02) (2.49e-02) (0.001) (9.63e-03) (0.005) (0.002) 
Inflation_rate  -5.90e-06 -2.53e-08 -7.45-03 -7.39e-03 -3.35e-06 -2.78e-03* -2.88e-03 -5.73e-03 5.08e-06 -1.49e-03 -2.20e-02 3.75e-03 -3.91e-03 -0.000 
  (4.86e-03) (5.36e-03) (6.06e-03) (6.03e-03) (9.09e-03) (1.55e-03) (1.66e-02) (1.71e-02) (1.06e-03) (1.65e-03) (1.49e-02) (3.47e-03) (1.72e-02) (0.000) 
Dinsur  -0.022 0.009 0.010 -0.022 -0.074* 0.019 -0.032 0.012 -0.021 0.069 -0.031 -0.097 -0.112* -0.011 
  (0.015) (0.090) (0.050) (0.060) (0.037) (0.029) (0.300) (0.038) (0.073) (0.074) (0.049) (0.071) (0.066) (0.059) 
Bank Supervision   -0.256*  -0.154  -0.079* -0.071 -0.093 0.012 -0.129 -0.198 -0.211 -0.102 -0.203 
   (0.145)  (0.185)  (0.047) (0.356) (0.438) (0.010) (0.294) (0.138) (0.561) (0.281) (0.182) 
Bank Regulatory Restriction   -0.085  -0.105  0.017 0.029 0.004 0.113 0.081 0.044 0.160 0.129 -0.089 
   (0.041)  (0.097)  (0.030) (0.342) (0.391) (0.185) (0.213) (0.147) (0.233) (0.310) (0.096) 
Bank Private Monitoring   0.173*  0.169  0.044 -0.019 0.119 0.006 0.010 0.213* 0.207 0.206 0.185* 
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   (0.096)  (0.110)  (0.033) (0.128) (0.337) (0.008) (0.016) (0.128) (0.182) (0.371) (0.108) 
Bank Capital Oversight   -0.014  -0.019  0.013 0.017 0.019 -0.026 0.027 0.091 0.116* 0.216* 0.000 
   (0.067)  (0.063)  (0.022) (0.200) (0.096) (0.329) (0.147) (0.192) (0.006) (0.127) (0.000) 
Crisis               -0.017** 
               (0.020) 
Islamic*Crisis*CGIt-1               -0.080*** 
               (0.020) 
ROAt-1      0.309***          
      (0.027)          
Constant 1.014*** 1.021*** 0.377** 0.334** 1.323*** 3.002*** 0.109*** 0.297** 1.198*** 1.009*** 0.954*** 0.261*** 1.016** 1.056** 0.378 
 (0.004) (0.040) (0.025) (0.024) (0.236) (0.162) (0.004) (0.147) (0.421) (0.012) (0.067) (0.077) (0.409) (0.528) (0.233) 
Chi2 17.83*** 158.83*** 163.15*** 176.64*** 184.73*** 141.85*** 54.89*** 55.40*** 35.11*** 43.07*** 26.48*** 33.86*** 27.76*** 25.30*** 33.91*** 
Observations 906 417 417 417 417 345 279 138 163 254 218 199 88 163 417 
Overall R2 0.026 0.284 0.291 0.311 0.322  0.577 0.306 0.343 0.727 0.737 0.337 0.886 0.316 0.345 
Year FE NO NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES NO 
Country FE NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
AR(1)-p-value      0.033          
AR(2)-p-value      0.381          
Hansen-J-P-value      0.879          
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Appendix 
Table A1 Descriptive statistics for corporate governance variables 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for the 12 governance items we use in constructing the corporate governance index (CGI). 
 
 
Islamic Banks Conventional Banks 
Corporate 
Governance 
Variables 
Definition 
Observations Mean Std. Dev. Median Skewness Kurtosis Observations  Mean        
 Std. 
Dev.       Median Skewness  
 
Kurtosis 
Board Size 
Board Size 
340 9.206 3.069 9.000 1.454 6.173 687 9.643 2.442 10.000 0.776 5.273 
Board 
Independence 
Ratio between number of independent directors to total board size 
327 0.290 0.277 0.273 0.731 2.581 600 0.178 0.139 0.167 4.567 0.873 
 Female Director 
Number of female directors on the board 
331 0.221 0.653 0.000 4.114 22.965 675 0.412 0.791 0.000 2.660 12.568 
Board Meetings    
Number of board meetings in the year 
286 7.888 4.642 6.000 1.810 6.534 553 8.333 4.721 7.000 1.984 7.829 
Board Attendance 
Percent of board attendance 
219 80.572 11.513 81.860 -0.462 2.425 456 85.767 11.076 89.185 -0.865 3.387 
Board Committees       
Number of board committees 
319 4.078 1.248 4.000 1.681 15.040 630 3.711 1.420 4.000 0.405 3.364 
Chair 
Independence      
Is the Chairperson Independent? If yes then one, otherwise zero 
328 0.259 0.439 0.000 1.099 2.209 611 0.296 0.457 0.000 0.893 1.797 
CEO-Chair Role 
Duality      
Are the roles of Chair/CEO duality? If yes, then one, otherwise zero 
340 0.156 0.363 0.000 1.897 4.600 719 0.207 0.406 0.000 1.445 3.087 
CEO-Internal     
If the CEO is not internally recruited, then one, otherwise zero 
338 0.834 0.372 1.000 -1.798 4.234 671 0.611 0.488 1.000 -0.455 1.207 
CEO Qualification 
We assign one for CEO qualification as high school, two for BA, three 
MA, four for MBA, and five for PhD or professional accounting (CA) 
and finance (CFA) qualifications 
 324 3.346 0.950 4.000 -0.215 1.859 659 3.660 0.934 4.000 -0.252 2.209 
CEO Banking 
Experience 
Years of CEO banking experience 
306 24.199 7.956 24.000 0.396 3.830 614 28.016 9.904 29.000 0.162 3.223 
CEO Tenure 
Years of CEO board tenure 
 325 4.120 3.300 3.000 2.069 9.091 590 7.625 7.717 5.000 1.645 5.223 
 
